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EARLY PHASED DEPLOYMENT OF SDI AS A
NATIONAL INSURANCE POLICY
Jack F. Kemp*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In March of 1983, President Ronald Reagan gave new hope to future
generations when he proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Far from
being the "Star Wars" it is often derided as, it is a promise of greater security
and stability in a dangerous world.
SDI should be viewed as the greatest peace initiative and defense safeguard
in postwar history. Most of its opponents appear totally unconcerned by the far
larger Soviet programs in both strategic defense and in strategic offense. These
opponents also appear unconcerned about the long-term instabilities and risks
inherent in strategic deterrence based solely on the threat of "mutual assured
destruction" (MAD).
Today, the need for early phased deployment of strategic and related regional
and tactical missile defenses is clearer than ever before. The security of the
United States and the future of sound arms control are becoming increasingly
dependent upon a national commitment to accelerate the move from research to
deployment of SDI's first phases. Some would mistakenly continue to limit the
SDI program in the name of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
However, the United States must stop restricting and delaying SDI deployment
because of a treaty long ago broken by Soviet violations. This is especially true
in light of the Soviet Union's enormous and ongoing military investment.
With the United States achieving substantial progress, and with, adequate
funding, initial deployment of a comprehensive SDI could begin in 1992 with an
Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS). This system would become an
essential defense insurance policy for the future of the United States. It would
also help to create a safer, more stable world.
The following essay first examines the policy reasons for the accelerated
phased deployment of SDI. After a discussion of Soviet arms control violations
and Soviet initiatives in space, the piece will focus on the Soviet negotiations
push against SDI. The essay will then explain the rationale supporting a U.S.
go-ahead for accelerated SDI deployment and will consider the ALPS plan as a
first step. Finally, the essay will evaluate the future of SDI.
II.

SDI: REASONS FOR ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT

There are at least four major reasons why the United States should accelerate
deployment of SDI as a vital insurance policy for its own defense, for that of
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its allies, and for the safety of the entire world. These reasons include: the
deterrence aspect of SDI, Soviet cheating in arms control agreements, the Soviet
ABM Treaty "breakout," and the improvement of conventional arms and other
"spinoffs."
A.

Deterrence: From MADness to Defense

The United States needs SDI in order to move away from the long-term
instabilities of deterrence based exclusively on the suicidal threat of MAD. It is
within the power of the United States to prevent war by basing deterrence
increasingly on defense rather than relying on offensive weapons to avenge a
Soviet strike. Such a shift would be both highly ethical and highly prudent for
American citizens and their children.
Each deployment step of SDI would contribute a significant measure of
deterrence against attack and protection against missiles, whether launched in
anger or by accident, and from whatever source.
B.

Soviet Cheating

The West needs SDI as an insurance policy against Soviet cheating in arms
control agreements. This includes the newly adopted Intermediate Range Nuclear
Force (INF) Treaty and the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
As detailed in comprehensive Reagan Administration reports to the United
States Congress, the Soviet Union has systematically violated major existing
agreements, including understandings reached at the first and second round of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II), the ABM Treaty, two
chemical weapons conventions, two nuclear test limitation agreements and the
Helsinki Accords.
SDI and associated tactical and intermediate-range anti-ballistic missile technologies would provide deterrence and protection against such cheating. It would
also help to prevent Soviet exploitation of serious definitional, data and verification problems in the INF and proposed START treaties-problems which are
likely to prove largely intractable.
C.

Soviet ABM Treaty Breakout

The United States needs SDI as an insurance policy against the Soviet
Union's increased efforts to achieve a decisive monopoly in strategic defense
systems. Soviet strategic defense program expenditures are estimated by the
Defense Department at two hundred billion dollars over the past decade. This is
some twenty billion dollars per year, five times higher than the current U.S.
spending level for strategic defense of some four billion dollars per year.
The Soviet strategic defense program includes the modernization of the twolayer antiballistic missile system deployed around Moscow, as well as accelerated
preparations in the form of radars, missiles and tests for nationwide territorial
antiballistic missile defense.
The massive Soviet effort to dominate space has a civil defense counterpart
which is worth noting. An extensive network of deep tunnels for Soviet political
and military leaders and for key industries also reflects the Soviet belief in
strategic defense and in the ability to prevail in a nuclear conflict with the United
States.
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Improved Conventional Arms and Other SDI Spinoffs

SDI technologies will provide important spinoffs and benefits for improving
the West's conventional defenses against far larger Soviet forces. For example,
lasers and tracking sensors have clear anti-armor, anti-aircraft and anti-cruise
missile applications which could prove particularly cost-effective in meeting the
growing Soviet conventional arms threat. Furthermore, as with the U.S. space
program of the 1960's, SDI technologies may also prove beneficial to nonmilitary
areas such as medicine and industry.
III.

SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS AND THE SOVIET PUSH
FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE IN SPACE

In assessing the requirements for SDI, Americans should have no illusions
about the Soviet Union's aim to achieve strategic dominance with its own strategic
defense programs, notwithstanding recent or existing arms control agreements.
This aim is exemplified by Soviet arms control violations and the Soviet push
for strategic dominance in space.
A.

Soviet Arms Control Violations

President Reagan's December 2, 1987, report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements cited an expanded pattern of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. One such instance involved the Krasnoyarsk radar in
Siberia which, because of its inland location and interior direction, and its
proximity to major Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch sites,
marks a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. President Reagan's report cited
another Soviet radar installation under development at Gomel as a new Treaty
violation.
In addition to the ABM Treaty violations involved in the Krasnoyarsk and
Gomel radars, President Reagan's report cited several troublesome activities,
which suggest that the Soviets may be preparing for unilateral deployment of a
prohibited nationwide ABM defense. These activities include, first, the apparent
testing and development of components required for an ABM system which could
be deployed to a site in months rather than years; second, the probable concurrent
testing of air defense components and ABM components; third, the development
of a modern air defense system, the SA-12, which may have some ABM
capabilities and, fourth, the demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers
and to refire the interceptor missile in a period of time shorter than previously
required.
B.

The Soviet Push for Dominance in Space

According to an in-depth report made public in November 1987 by the
Defense Department, The Soviet Space Challenge, the Soviet Union has opened
up a significant U.S.-Soviet "space gap." This inequity results as the Soviets
vigorously pursue programs to assure that their capability for military control of
space includes strategic defenses.
Even prior to the Challenger disaster in January 1987, which set back U.S.
space launches for many months, the Soviet Union had undertaken about twenty
times as many space launches as the United States, with substantial military
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implications. Similarly, the Soviet Union has a space station in place which
conducts extensive military experiments. The United States has no such facility.
These efforts significantly contribute to Soviet capabilities for a wholesale breakout from the ABM Treaty.
C.

The Soviet Negotiations Push Against SDI

It is ironic that, as the possibility of a wholesale Soviet breakout from the
ABM Treaty and the need for an SDI insurance policy are both greater than
ever before, the Soviet Union has had some success in its all-out effort to delay
and kill the U.S. SDI program while accelerating its own.
It is clearly the Soviet Union's highest arms control priority to assure a
Soviet monopoly in strategic defense, particularly in space, by pushing for SDI
funding cuts and testing restrictions, and by seeking to kill off any U.S. SDI
deployment, even while threatening the United States and its allies with ABM
Treaty breakout and blackmail.
At the arms control negotiations in Geneva, and at summit meetings, the
Soviets are pressing the United States to eliminate the possibility of early phased
deployment of SDI. First, they demand that the United States commit itself to
abiding for seven to ten more years by a treaty that the Soviet Union long ago
broke with its violations. Second, the Soviets continue to insist that the progress
of START negotiations in achieving deep cuts in strategic weapons be linked to
severe constraints on the U.S. SDI program.
I am convinced that, while certain START cuts, accompanied by appropriate
sublimits and safeguards, could have merit on their own terms, their implementation would require the insurance policy of an early, incrementally deployed
SDI to deter against Soviet cheating and to safeguard U.S. national security.
Commenting on the clear Soviet negotiations objective directed against SDI,
former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger told me, on November 21, 1987,
"The thrust of the Soviet proposal is to impose artificial constraints on SDI that
will prevent us from developing and deploying strategic defenses." Secretary
Weinberger added that the Soviet proposal on testing parameters "contains many
loopholes and is unverifiable." Caveat emptor.
IV.

UNITED STATES GO-AHEAD FOR ACCELERATED SDI
DEPLOYMENT

As both nations negotiate to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals and the risks
of war, it is important that the United States keep Soviet programs, broken
agreements and diplomatic goals in mind at all times. In addition to safeguarding
the future of the United States through sound negotiations, it needs to draw
fully on the best of U.S. technology to accelerate deployment of missile defenses.
Let the air be cleared regarding where the Soviets stand on feasibility. While
some have characterized SDI as a fantasy or a fraud, the Soviet Union's far
larger investments in its own strategic defense programs clearly indicate that the
Soviets believe strategic defense to be feasible. However, it was only recently that
any Soviet official, in this case General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev himself,
began to acknowledge that the Soviets had any SDI program at all.
I am convinced, as are many of the best U.S. scientists, that SDI is in fact
far more a political than a technological problem. I have visited the laboratories

19891

SDI as Insurance

where SDI research is taking place; much significant progress is being made. In
June of 1988, I undertook an intensive three-day fact-finding trip to learn more
about SDI. My briefings included a review of major SDI elements and a
demonstration of the overall program's National Test Bed, a facility which is
integrating the operational elements of the comprehensive SDI system.
The scientific and technological strides achieved since my briefing visits are
truly outstanding. For example, in the areas of discrimination, acquisition,
tracking, computers, and optics, the United States has crossed new thresholds.
Many major components of these systems can be made substantially lighter,
smaller and more cost-effective than scientists thought feasible in the past.
Significant advances in discriminating live warheads from decoys have been
made through an active flight test program of sensors. Substantial gains have
been made in the integration of space-based laser technologies, from reducing
the power requirements to enhancing laser beam pointing and tracking, and to
the optics required to focus the beam. U.S. scientists have also resolved outstanding issues of high velocity ground-based interceptors, including problems of
cooling the kill vehicle, separation of the shroud prior to intercept, and elimination
of foresight error.
The SDI program has demonstrated that streamlined management structures
and adequate funding can save significant development time. Funding cuts have
clearly delayed several programs and will probably do so in the future, what
with the current spending of four billion dollars for fiscal year 1989 falling short
of the $4.8 billion Reagan Administration request and the original Department
of Defense request of $6.2 billion. Yet, other experiments conducted on an
accelerated schedule have proven once again what the United States can accomplish when it is determined and bold in laying out a course of action.
One message comes through loud and clear from all the scientists and
program managers with whom I have spoken: With adequate funding and a
lifting of current testing restrictions, SDI is ready to move rapidly from the
drawing board to actual implementation.
V.

AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH PROTECTION SYSTEM AS A FIRST
SDI STEP

The United States can now, in my opinion, go ahead with full-scale development of ground-based interceptors and the supporting sensors to protect the
U.S. against accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles (the ALPS
program), whether launched by the Soviet Union or by a third country such as
Muammar Qaddaffi's Libya or Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran.
Accordingly, I have proposed an amendment urging early deployment of an
ALPS system at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota as an initial and
integral step to a comprehensive SDI. Such an initial step, to be integrated as
soon as possible with space-based SDI elements, could include exoatmospheric
and endoatmospheric interceptors, ground-based radars and other technologies
available now or in the very near future. Beginning in 1992 at Grand Forks, this
system could also be expanded to other sites and, in moving beyond the ABM
Treaty, to more than one hundred launchers at each site.
Interestingly, even within the terms of the ABM Treaty, two sites with one
hundred launchers each would be permitted in view of the fact that at the
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December 1987 summit, both Soviet and the U.S. negotiators stated a committment to the ABM Treaty "as signed in 1972." In 1972, at the Treaty's signing,
the two countries had not yet signed the 1974 Protocol that reduced the two
permitted deployment sites to one site. The initial Grand Forks site is estimated
to cost about ten billion dollars, with additional sites along the U.S. coastlines
estimated to cost about three billion dollars each.
On May 11, 1988, there were 167 votes cast in favor of my amendment in
the U.S. House of Representatives. On May 13, Senator Malcolm Wallop (RWy.) received 37 votes for essentially the same amendment in the U.S. Senate.
I believe these Congressional votes show a significant movement in support of
SDI deployment to provide increased protection and deterrence for U.S. security.
VI. SDI: THE FUTURE
Even at a time of budget restrictions, there should be no question whether
the United States can, as a matter of highest priority, support SDI as a fundamental defense insurance policy for the benefit of its own people, its allies and
friends. There should be no question whether the United States can do so at a
spending level above the current level of 1.5 percent of the U.S. defense budget,
or one-third of one percent of the total federal budget. Working closely with its
key allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as Israel and Japan,
the United States should accelerate, not cut, SDI and its related anti-tactical
ballistic missile programs.
I am confident that, with the committment of President George Bush and
with congressional support, the American people would strongly endorse such a
step and that the appropriate funds would be provided. Funding could come
from several sources, including the closing of unnecessary military bases and the
reduction of national debt-servicing costs through monetary reforms that would
lower interest rates.
SDI is a problem of vision and leadership. Some show their bias and their
ignorance by calling SDI a fantasy and a fraud; they would essentially eliminate
SDI. Others support some research and eventual deployment. But all too few yet
support the necessary acceleration of early phased deployment of SDI.
Those in the anti-SDI brigade ignore the substantial technological progress
achieved by the SDI program. They ignore Soviet violations of arms control
agreements and the massive Soviet strategic defense and offense programs. They
would lock American citizens and their children into a MAD deterrence policy.
They would circumscribe, delay or cripple the U.S. SDI program by insisting on
U.S. adherence to narrow terms of a treaty long ago broken by the Soviet Union.
The anti-SDI forces insist on a perfect SDI system. They forget that under
the current MAD policy, all nuclear missiles would get through, but that each
SDI layer would provide additional protection from missile attack. Thus, they
would keep from the American people and the nations of the world the substantial
benefit that each incremental SDI deployment phase-such as ALPS-would
bring in complicating a potential attacker's plan and in providing significant
additional deterrence and security.
VII. CONCLUSION
We must put these false arguments against SDI aside. We must act in support
of the American people's desire for strategic defense-a desire reflected in poll
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after poll. I am encouraged by the substantial congressional support that Senator
Wallop and I received for our 1988 ALPS amendments. Above all, I believe it
is simply not prudent to continue any longer-especially in the name of a treaty
long ago broken by the Soviet Union-to constrain and to delay accelerated
deployment of SDI. Let us move now to put our SDI national defense insurance
policy into place as a highest national defense priority.

